Democratic transition has failed to make local urban governments in Mexico more responsive to the public interest. This critical problem is made evident by the persistence of corruption in the form of bribery, shirking, influence, cronyism and nepotism. In examining why the problem of corruption remains entrenched, the central thesis of Lagunes is that free and fair elections have failed to make local governments in Mexico more responsive to the public interest because of institutional factors that are beyond the voters' immediate realm of influence. These factors are special interest groups that rely on corruption to achieve dishonest ends; a vitiated bureaucracy; a flawed legal framework; an ineffective judicial system; and impunity. In order to disrupt the corrupt status quo and deliver on the democratic promise of heightened accountability, this dissertation puts forth an empirically tested policy recommendation: external audits. The author concludes that newly democratized regimes that face entrenched corruption should depend on scrupulous and targeted external audits in order to heighten government responsiveness to the public interest.